The Fiat-Shamir transform is a well studied paradigm for removing interaction from publiccoin protocols. We investigate whether the resulting non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems also exhibit non-malleability properties that have up to now only been studied for NIZK proof systems in the common reference string model: first, we formally define simulation soundness and a weak form of simulation extraction in the random oracle model (ROM). Second, we show that in the ROM the Fiat-Shamir transform meets these properties under lenient conditions. A consequence of our result is that, in the ROM, we obtain truly efficient non malleable NIZK proof systems essentially for free. Our definitions are sufficient for instantiating the Naor-Yung paradigm for CCA2-secure encryption, as well as a generic construction for signature schemes from hard relations and simulation-extractable NIZK proof systems. These two constructions are interesting as the former preserves both the leakage resilience and key-dependent message security of the underlying CPA-secure encryption scheme, while the latter lifts the leakage resilience of the hard relation to the leakage resilience of the resulting signature scheme.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge proof systems [27] are a powerful tool for designing cryptographic primitives and protocols. They force malicious parties to behave according to specification while allowing honest parties to protect their secrets. Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [11] consist of a single proof message passed from the prover to the verifier. They are particularly useful for designing public-key encryption and signature schemes as the proof can be added to the ciphertext and signature respectively. Understanding the most efficient NIZK proofs that are sufficiently strong, i.e., sufficiently non-malleable, for building signature and encryption schemes with strong security properties is thus of fundamental importance in cryptography. It was shown by Goldreich and Oren [26] that NIZK proofs are unattainable in the standard model. To avoid this impossibility result, one must rely on additional assumptions, such as common reference strings [10] (CRS model) or idealizations of hash functions [8] (random oracle model, ROM).
With the aim of finding the "right" definition in the non-interactive case, several flavors of non-malleability [20] have been introduced for NIZK in the CRS model [39, 40, 25, 32] . The notion of simulation soundness, which bridges soundness and zero knowledge, guarantees that soundness holds even after seeing accepting proofs, for both true and false statements, produced by the simulator. This strengthened soundness notion was first proposed by Sahai in [39] , and later improved by De Santis et al. [40] . The notion of simulation extraction [40, 29] in addition requires that accepting proofs allow to extract witnesses. Different variants of simulation extraction have been proposed by [16, 19] .
Until recently, zero-knowledge in general and NIZK in particular were considered to be primarily of theoretical interest. Significant exceptions being efficient Σ-protocols [17, 18] and their non-interactive relatives based on the Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform [22] . A Σ-protocol is a three-move interactive scheme where the prover sends the first message and the verifier sends a random challenge as the second message. In a nutshell, the Fiat-Shamir transform removes the interaction by computing the challenge as the hash value of the first message and the theorem that is being proven. Σ-protocols and the Fiat-Shamir transform are widely used in the construction of efficient identification [22] , anonymous credential [15] , signature [37, 1] , e-voting schemes [9] , and many other cryptographic constructions [12, 6, 24] .
Most work on the provable security of zero-knowledge has, however, been conducted either on interactive proof systems in the plain model or on NIZK in the CRS model, while practitioners often preferred Fiat-Shamir based NIZK proofs for their simplicity and efficiency. The use of the Fiat-Shamir transform was most thoroughly explored in the security proofs of signature schemes in the random oracle model [37, 1] , but was otherwise often used heuristically. The question thus arises whether one can lay sound foundations for the FS transform in the light of recent research on CRS-based NIZKs. To this end, we provide non-malleability definitions for NIZK in the random oracle model that closely follow the established CRS-based definitions [29] . An earlier result oriented in the same direction, but concerning a Σ-protocol for a specific language, 1 was given by Fouque and Pointcheval [24] . Their proof strategy relies on the forking lemma [37] and (implicitly) on the fact that the Σ-protocol they consider has a particular property called strong special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SS-HVZK). Since there exist Σ-protocols that do not satisfy the SS-HVZK property, Fouque and Pointcheval's proof cannot be immediately extended to the general case. Moreover, we make the random oracle explicit in our definition, which is crucial as definitions in the random oracle model can be brittle [42] .
Our first observation is that much less is required to show simulation soundness for any FS-NIZK proof. Namely, in the random oracle model, simulation soundness simply follows from the soundness and the HVZK properties of the underlying interactive protocol. In particular, it is neither necessary to rely on the forking lemma, nor on the strong 2 property of SS-HVZK. We also show that the proof strategy of [24] , when generalized properly to any Σ-protocol, yields something more than just simulation soundness. In fact, one gets some form of simulation extractability, which we call weak simulation extractability. In a nutshell, full simulation extractability requires that even after seeing many simulated proofs, whenever an adversary outputs a new accepted proof, we can build an algorithm to extract a valid witness. Sometimes, such a strong extraction property is called online extraction [23] because the extractor outputs a witness directly after receiving the adversary's proof. In comparison, our notion is weaker in that it allows the extractor to fully control the adversary (i.e., rewind it).
Our contribution. Our contributions are threefold. First, we formally define the notions of zero-knowledge (which holds trivially for the Fiat-Shamir transform), simulation soundness, and simulation extractability for NIZKs in the random oracle model. Second, we show that simulation soundness and a weak form of simulation extractability come for free if one uses the FS-transform for turning Σ-protocols into NIZK proof systems. Third, we investigate the consequences of this result by showing that our definitions are sufficient for instantiating the NaorYung paradigm for constructing CCA2-secure encryption schemes, and generic construction for signature schemes from hard relations and simulation-extractable NIZK proof systems [19] . These two constructions are particularly interesting as the former preserves both leakage resilience and key-dependent message security of the underlying CPA-secure encryption scheme, while the latter lifts the leakage resilience of the hard relation to the leakage resilience of the resulting signature scheme. To our knowledge, these are the most efficient schemes having such properties, if one is willing to rely on the ROM. 3 Related work. The only other efficient transform for Σ-protocols yielding simulation soundness (again in the random oracle model) is Fischlin's transform [23] which is designed with the purpose of online extraction and is less efficient than the classical Fiat-Shamir transform. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate whether Fischlin's transform achieves a stronger form of simulation extractability. We notice that in the interactive case, a general transform from any Σ-protocol to an (unbounded) simulation-sound Σ-protocol using one-time signatures has been proposed [25] . In the common reference string model the most efficient simulationsound or simulation extractable NIZK proof system are based on Groth-Sahai proofs [30] . One has however to pay the price of proving a structure-preserving CCA secure encryption [19] (for true-simulation extraction) or a structure-preserving signature scheme [3] (for full simulation extraction).
Preliminaries
Notation. Let k be a security parameter. A function ν is called negligible if ν(k) ≤ k −c for any c > 0 and sufficiently large k. Given two functions f, g, we write f ≈ g if there exists a negligible function ν such that |f (k) − g(k)| < ν(k). Given an algorithm A, y ← A(x) means that y is the output of A on input x; when A is randomized, then y is a random variable. We write A H to denote the fact that A has oracle access to some function H. PPT stands for 2 In Appendix B, we show a separation between the two notions of special HVZK [17] (S-HVZK) and SS-HVZK, by showing that any S-HVZK Σ-protocol can be turned into another Σ-protocol which is still S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK, assuming that one-way functions exist. 3 In particular we obtain as a special case the Alwen et al. [4] leakage-resilient signature scheme based on the Okamoto identification scheme.
probabilistic-polynomial time. A decision problem related to a language L ⊆ {0, 1} * consists in determining whether a string x is in L or not. Given an instance x, we say that A decides (or recognizes) L if, after a finite number of steps, the algorithm halts and outputs A(x) = 1 if x ∈ L, otherwise A(x) = 0. (Sometimes, we may call "theorem" a string belonging to the language at hand.) We can associate to any NP-language
where |w| ≤ poly(|x|). The string w is called a witness or certificate for membership of x ∈ L. For NP, w corresponds to the non-deterministic choices made by A.
Interactive protocols. An interactive proof system (IPS) for membership in L is a two-party protocol, where a prover wants to convince an efficient verifier that a string x belongs to L. In a zero-knowledge interactive proof system, a prover P can convince a verifier V that x ∈ L without revealing anything beyond the fact that the statement is indeed true. Informally, this means that V cannot exploit the interaction with P for gaining extra-knowledge. Such a property is formalized by requiring the existence of an efficient algorithm S, the zero-knowledge simulator, which produces messages indistinguishable from conversations between an honest prover P and a malicious verifier V * . Besides the zero-knowledge property, any proof system satisfies two standard requirements: proving true statements is always possible, while it should be infeasible to convince the verifier to accept a false statement as correct. These two conditions are called completeness and soundness respectively. Related to the concept of interactive proof systems, but even more subtle, is the notion of proof of knowledge. In a proof of knowledge (PoK), P wants to convince V that he knows a secret witness which implies the validity of some assertion, and not merely that the assertion is true. To formalize the fact that a prover actually "knows something", we require that there exists an efficient algorithm E, called knowledge extractor, that when given complete access to the program of the prover can extract the witness. An IPS or an interactive PoK is called public-coin when the verifier's moves consist merely of tossing coins and sending their outcomes to the prover. (In contrast, in a private-coin IPS the verifier does not need to show the outcome of the coins to the prover [28] .) We are mainly interested in a specific class of public-coin interactive PoK systems for NP-languages, called Σ-protocols. Here, the parties involved share a string x belonging to a language L ∈ NP and the prover also holds a witness w for membership of x ∈ L. Thus, the prover P wants to convince the verifier V that it "knows" a witness w for x, i.e. that x is in the language, without revealing the witness itself. Σ-protocols have a 3-move shape where the first message α, called commitment, is sent by the prover and then, alternatively, the parties exchange the other messages β and γ, called (respectively) challenge and response. The interaction is depicted in Figure 1 . Besides the standard properties held by any IPS, Σ-protocols satisfy a flavour of zero-knowledgecalled honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK) -saying that an honest verifier taking part in the protocol does not learn anything beyond the validity of the theorem being proven.
Definition 1 (Σ-protocols).
A Σ-protocol Σ = (P, V) for an NP-language L is a three-round public-coin IPS where P = (P 0 , P 1 ) and V = (V 0 , V 1 ) are PPT algorithms, with the following additional proprieties:
Completeness. If x ∈ L, any proper execution of the protocol between P and V ends with the verifier accepting P's proof.
Honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK).
There exists an efficient algorithm S, called zero-knowledge simulator, such that for any PPT distinguisher D = (D 0 , D 1 ) and for any (x, w) ∈ R L , the view of the following two experiments, real and simulated, are computationally indistinguishable:
where P(x, w), V(x) denotes the verdict returned at the end of the interaction between P and V on common input x and private input w.
Soundness. If x /
∈ L then any malicious (even unbounded) prover P * is accepted only with negligible probability.
Special soundness. There exists an efficient algorithm E, called special extractor, such that given two accepting conversations (α, β, γ) and (α, β , γ ) for a string x, where
The special soundness property is strong enough to imply both soundness and that Σ-protocols are PoK [18] . Sometimes Σ-protocols are required to meet stronger notions of HVZK. 4 A non-standard condition that many Σ-protocols satisfy, introduced by Fischlin in [23] , requires that responses are quasi unique, i.e. given an accepting proof it should be infeasible to find a new valid response for that proof.
Definition 2 (Quasi unique responses).
A Σ-protocol has quasi unique responses if for any PPT A and for any security parameter k it holds:
A Σ-protocol has unique responses if the probability above is zero. The latter condition, defined by Unruh in [41] , is also known as strict soundness.
Min-entropy of commitments. Following [1, 2] , we use the concept of min-entropy to measure how likely it is for a commitment to collide with a fixed value.
Definition 3 (Min-entropy of commitment). Let k be a security parameter and L be an NP-language with relation R L . Consider a pair (x, w) ∈ R L and let (P, V) be an arbitrary three-round IPS. Denote with Coins(k) the set of coins used by the prover and consider the set A(x, w) = {P 0 (x, w; ρ) : ρ ← Coins(k))} of all possible commitments associated to w. The min-entropy function associated to (P, V) is defined as ε(k) = min (x,w) (− log 2 µ(x, w)),where the minimum is taken over all possible (x, w) drawn from R L and µ(x, w) is the maximum probability that a commitment takes on a particular value, i.e., µ(x, w) = max α∈A(x,w) (Prob[P 0 (x, w; ρ) = α : ρ ← Coins(k))]).
We say that (P, V) is non-trivial if ε(k) = ω(log(k)) is super-logarithmic in k. Often, the commitment is drawn uniformly from some set. In order for (P, V) to be non-trivial, this set must have size exponential in k. Notice that most of natural Σ-protocols meet such a condition and, in fact, non-triviality is quite easy to achieve, e.g. by appending redundant random bits to the commitment.
Forking lemma. To prove our second main result, we make use of the following version of the forking lemma, which appeared in [6] .
Lemma 1 (General forking lemma). Fix an integer Q and a set H of size h ≥ 2. Let P be a randomized program that on input y, h 1 , . . . , h Q returns a pair, the first element of which is an integer in the range 0, . . . , Q and the second element of which we refer to as a side output. Let IG be a randomized algorithm that we call the input generator. The accepting probability of P, denoted acc, is defined as the probability that J ≥ 1 in the experiment y ← IG; h 1 , . . . , h Q ← H; (J, s) ← P(y, h 1 , . . . , h Q ).
The forking algorithm F P associated to P is the randomized algorithm that on input y proceeds as follows.
Algorithm F P (y)
Pick coins ρ for P at random
Properties of NIZKs in the Random Oracle Model
Removing interaction. The Fiat-Shamir transform was originally designed to turn threeround identification schemes into efficient signature schemes. As Σ-protocols are an extension of three-round identification schemes, it is not surprising that they can be considered as a starting point for the Fiat-Shamir transform. The Fiat-Shamir paradigm applies to any Σ-protocol (and more generally to any three-round public-coin proof system): We start from an interactive protocol (P, V) and remove the interaction between P and V by replacing the challenge, chosen at random by the verifier, with a hash value H(α, x) computed by the prover, where H is a hash function modeled as a random oracle. Thus, the interactive protocol (P, V) is turned into a non-interactive one: The resulting protocol, denoted (P H , V H ), is called Fiat-Shamir proof system. Throughout this paper, we refer to the so called explicitly programmable random oracle model [42] (EPROM) where the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle explicitly. We model this by defining the zero-knowledge simulator S of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system as a stateful algorithm that can operate in two modes: (h i , st) ← S(1, st, q i ) takes care of answering random oracle queries (usually by lazy sampling) while (π, st) ← S(2, st, x) simulates the actual proof. Note that calls to S(1, · · · ) and S(2, · · · ) share the common state st that is updated after each operation.
Definition 4 (Unbounded non-interactive zero knowledge). Let L be a language in NP. Denote with (S 1 , S 2 ) the oracles such that S 1 (q i ) returns the first output of (h i , st) ← S(1, st, q i ) and S 2 (x, w) returns the first output of (π, st) ← S(2, st, x) if (x, w) ∈ R L . We say a protocol (P H , V H ) is a NIZK proof for language L in the random oracle model, if there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all PPT distinguishers D we have
where both P and
A well known fact is that, in the random oracle model, the Fiat-Shamir transform allows to efficiently design digital signature schemes [22] and non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols. In fact, an appealing characteristic of this transform is that many properties of the starting protocol are still valid after applying it. In particular, it has been proven that the Fiat-Shamir transform turns any three-round public-coin zero-knowledge interactive proof system into a NIZK proof system [8] . It is straightforward to prove that the same holds when the starting protocol is ZK only with respect to a honest verifier, as stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Fiat-Shamir NIZKs). Let k be a security parameter. Consider a non-trivial threeround public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge interactive proof system (P, V) for a language L ∈ NP. Let H be a function with range equal to the space of the verifier's coins. In the random oracle model the proof system (P H , V H ), derived from (P, V) by applying the FiatShamir transform, is unbounded non-interactive zero-knowledge.
sketch. To prove that the proof system (P H , V H ) is non-interactive zero-knowledge it is sufficient to show that there exists a simulator S as required in Definition 4. This can be done by invoking the HVZK simulator associated with the underlying interactive proof system. In particular, S works as follows:
• To answer query q = (x, α) to S 1 , S(1, st, q) lazily samples a lookup table T H kept in state st. It checks whether T H (q) is already defined. If this is the case, it returns the previously assigned value; otherwise it returns and sets a fresh random value (of the appropriate length).
• To answer query x to S 2 (respectively S 2 ), S(2, st, x) calls the HVZK simulator of (P, V) on input x to obtain a proof (α, β, γ). Then, it updates T H in such a way that β = T H (x, α).
If T H happens to be already defined on this input, S returns failure and aborts.
We call this simulator canonical. The main result of Fiat-Shamir [22] (expressed for their particular identification protocol) is that S is a "good" NIZK simulator. The crucial step in the proof is that the starting protocol (P, V) is non-trivial (cf. Definition 3), thus the probability of failure in each of the queries to S 2 is upper-bounded by Prob[failure] ≤ 2 −ε(k) , which is negligible in k.
Simulation soundness. The soundness property of a proof system ensures that no malicious prover can come up with an accepting proof for a string that does not belong to the language in question (i.e., for a false theorem). However, it is not clear whether this condition still holds after the attacker observes valid proofs for adaptively chosen (true or false) statements. The notion of simulation soundness deals with this case.
Definition 5 (Unbounded simulation soundness). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a proof system (P H , V H ) for L, with zero-knowledge simulator S. Denote with (S 1 , S 2 ) the oracles such that S 1 (q i ) returns the first output of (h i , st) ← S(1, st, q i ) and S 2 (x) returns the first output of (π, st) ← S(2, st, x). We say that (P H , V H ) is simulation sound with respect to S in the random oracle model, if for all PPT adversaries A the following holds:
where T is the list of pairs (x i , π i ), i.e., respectively queries asked to and proofs returned by the simulator.
We stress that the above definition relies crucially on the zero-knowledge property of (P H , V H ), as we use a probability experiment that defines a property of S to define a property about (P H , V H ). In particular the definition is most meaningful for a simulator S for which the simulation of the random oracle of S 1 is consistent with a truly random oracle H. Also note that S 2 allows A to ask for simulated proofs of false statements.
The possibility to request proofs of false statements has an interesting consequence: simulation soundness holds only with respect to specific simulators and not in general for all NIZK simulators. In particular, one can construct a NIZK proof system (P H , V H ) that is simulation sound with respect to a simulator S but for which there exists a valid NIZK simulatorŜ, such that (P H , V H ) cannot be simulation sound with respect toŜ. To see this, consider a V H that accepts all proofs if H(0) = 0.Ŝ simulates a consistent random oracle until it receives a proof of a false statement (one of which could be hard-coded inŜ or easy to recognize) at which point it sets T H (0) = 0. Note that a similar counterexample exists for CRS-based NIZK [29] :Ŝ 2 can simply return the simulation trapdoor when queried on a false statement.
Simulation extractability. Combining simulation soundness and knowledge extraction, we may require that even after seeing (polynomially) many simulated proofs, whenever A makes a new proof it is possible to extract a witness. This property is called simulation extractability, and implies simulation soundness. Indeed, if we can extract a witness from the adversary's proof even with small probability, then obviously the statement must belong to the language in question. We introduce a weaker flavor of simulation extractability which we call weak simulation extractability. The main difference with full simulation extractability is that the extractor E A is now given complete control over the adversary A, meaning that it is allowed to rewind A and gets to see the answers of (S 1 , S 2 ). Moreover, we require that if A outputs an accepting proof with some probability, then E A can extract with almost the same probability.
Definition 6 (Weak simulation extractability). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a NIZK proof system (P H , V H ) for L with zero-knowledge simulator S. Let (S 1 , S 2 ) be oracles returning the first output of (h i , st) ← S(1, st, q i ) and (π, st) ← S(2, st, x) respectively. We say that (P H , V H ) is weakly simulation-extractable with extraction error ν and with respect to S in the random oracle model, if for all PPT adversaries A there exists an efficient algorithm E A with access to the answers T H , T of (S 1 , S 2 ) respectively such that the following holds. Let:
where the probability space in both cases is over the random choices of S and the adversary's random tape ρ. Then, there exist a constant d > 0 and a polynomial p such that whenever acc ≥ ν, we have ext
The above definition is inspired by similar notions in the context of proofs of knowledge [5, 31, 41] . The value ν is called extraction error of the proof system. We omit for better readability that values acc, ext, p, ν all depend on the security parameter k. Note that a non-negligible extractor error can be made exponentially small by sequential repetitions (see Appendix C for a proof).
Proposition 1 (Extraction error amplification). Let (P H , V H ) be a weakly simulation extractable NIZK proof system with extraction error ν. Then, the proof system (P H , V H ) obtained by repeating sequentially (P H , V H ) for a number n of times yields a weakly simulation extractable NIZK proof system with extraction error ν n .
It is useful to look at the relation between weak simulation extractability and the following stronger property modeling online-extraction.
Definition 7 (Full Simulation extractability). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a NIZK proof system (P H , V H ) for L with simulator S. Let (S 1 , S 2 ) be oracles returning the first output of (h i , st) ← S(1, st, q i ) and (π, st) ← S(2, st, x) respectively. We say that (P H , V H ) is strongly simulation extractable with respect to S in the random oracle model, if there exists an efficient algorithm E such that for all PPT adversaries A the following holds. Let:
where T is the list of transcripts (x i , π i ) returned by the simulator and the probability space is over the random choices of S and the adversary's randomness ρ.
Note that both our unbounded simulation soundness and our full simulation extractability definitions can be instantiated by common reference string based schemes. H turns into a random constant function that always returns the reference string, and the state st consists of the simulation and extraction trapdoors.
4 On the Non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
Simulation Soundness
We now show that NIZK proofs obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from any IPS of the public-coin type additionally satisfying the HVZK property are simulation sound. Since Σ-protocols are a special class of HVZK public-coin IPSs, we get as a corollary that Fiat-Shamir NIZK proofs obtained from Σ-protocols are simulation-sound.
Theorem 2 (Simulation soundness of the Fiat-Shamir transform). Consider a non-trivial threeround public-coin HVZK interactive proof system (P, V) for a language L ∈ NP, with quasi unique responses. In the random oracle model, the proof system (P H , V H ) derived from (P, V) via the Fiat-Shamir transform is a simulation-sound NIZK with respect to its canonical simulator S.
Proof. We assume that (P H , V H ) is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system with the simulator S described in the proof of Theorem 1, and show that (P H , V H ) is simulation sound. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the simulation soundness of the non-interactive protocol with non-negligible probability
In such a case, we are able to build two reductionsP and P * which, by using A as a black-box, violate either the quasi unique response or the soundness properties of the underlying interactive protocol (P, V) respectively, contradicting our hypothesis. Recall that S 1 simulates answers to the RO, while S 2 replies with an accepting proof π. Without loss of generality we assume that whenever adversary A succeeds and outputs an accepting proof (α , γ ), she has previously queried the oracle S 1 on input (x , α ). The argument for this is that it is straightforward to transform any adversary that violates this condition into an adversary that makes one additional query to S 1 and wins with the same probability. A simple but crucial observation is that adversary A may have learned α by querying the oracle S 2 on input x or might have computed it itself. We denote the first by the event proof, the second by the event proof. As these events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, we have:
Now we have two different cases to analyze, each of them corresponding to the probability in the expression above.
In the first case (when proof happens), we assume that x is asked to S 2 and the answer is a proof of the type (α , −). We show how to use an adversary A that makes use of (x , α ) in its fake proof to build a reductionP. In this way we bound Prob[A wins ∧ proof] by the probability thatP wins in breaking the quasi unique response property. First, observe that if A wins with a proof (α , −) and makes the query x to S 2 , she implicitly has to set also the value S 1 (x , α ) := β such that H(α , x ) = β. This forces her to use such values for producing a proof x , π . Thus, the fake proof she outputs must be of the type π = (α , −) for x such that H(x , α ) = β. On the other hand, such a proof cannot be the same returned by the simulator, since a forgery cannot appear in the list T . This means that a fake proof for x produced by A must have the first argument equal to α , gives by the simulator S 2 . But as the proof of A is accepted the responses must be different, and soP must be successful in breaking the quasi unique response property. This intuition can be formalized by giving an explicit reduction from A toP.
Consider an algorithmP which runs A internally as a black-box. Thus,P sees all queries A makes to the oracles S 1 and S 2 and produces their answers. The internal description ofP follows:
•P answers S 1 and S 2 and keeps lists T H and T respectively as the real simulator S would.
• When A outputs a fake proof (α , γ ) for x ,P looks through its lists T and T H until it finds (x , (α , γ)) and ((x , α ), β) respectively;
• It returns (x , α , β, γ , γ).
We claim that algorithmP breaks the quasi unique response property. Indeed, the proof produced by A is accepting by V H on common input x . On the other hand, the proof (α , γ) is given by the simulator, therefore it must be accepting for x . Given this, it holds
where H(x , α ) = β. The conclusion is that either γ = γ , that is excluded since A cannot win by printing a simulated proof, or algorithmP succeeds in breaking the quasi unique response property. We obtain:
In case proof does not happen, we can use adversary A that does not query S 2 with input x to build a reduction P * and bound Prob[A wins ∧ proof] by the probability Prob[P * wins] · Q of breaking the soundness of the underlying interactive scheme. P * runs A as a black-box and has to simulate its environment by answering the queries to S 1 and S 2 in a consistent way. More precisely, P * works as follows. It guesses uniformly at random an index j ∈ [Q] and replies to queries to S 1 and S 2 in the following way:
2. Answer query x to S 2 : Run the HVZK simulator of the interactive protocol on input
x to obtain an accepting proof (α, β, γ), and program the oracle H in such a way that H(x, α) := β. If the NIZK simulator returns failure, which happens when H(x, α) is already defined, output failure and abort, otherwise output (α, γ).
3. Answer V's challenge: Let x , (α , γ ) be the instance and the proof output by A. Return γ to V as the response to challenge β j in step 1b.
We need to estimate the probability that P * succeeds in breaking the soundness of the interactive scheme (P, V) in terms of the probability that A outputs an accepting proof (α , γ ) for a false statement x . Suppose that (x , α ) has been asked to the random oracle as the j -th query and we have j = j , i.e., P * guesses the correct index for which A outputs an accepting proof for a false statement x . In such a case, P * breaks the soundness of (P, V). Hence, we get:
where the second equality comes from the fact that P * guesses j correctly indipendently of the event that A is successful and proof happens. Since the index j is chosen at random in [Q], we have Prob[P * wins] = 1 Q · Prob[A wins ∧ proof]. Whenever P * wins, it breaks the soundness of the interactive scheme: by hypothesis, this happens only with negligible probability. Therefore:
Now we can bound the probability that A succeeds. As we assume, A breaks the simulation soundness of the scheme with non-negligible probability :
On the quasi-unique responses condition. We remark that assuming (P, V) has quasiunique responses is not an artifact of the proof. In fact, without this property, proofs would be malleable and breaking the simulation soundness would be an easy task. Consider a FS-NIZK proof system for which responses are not quasi-unique. An efficient adversary A can always query the simulator on input a false statement x , obtaining a simulated proof S 2 (x ) → π = (α , β , γ ). Given π , A might be able to find, with non-negligible probability, a new response γ = γ such that (α , β , γ ) is also accepting. Hence, the scheme cannot be simulation sound.
Weak Simulation Extractability
The argument Fouque and Pointcheval use in [24] to show that the proof system they consider is simulation sound is roughly as follows. Assume there exists an adversary A which outputs a pair (x , π ) breaking the simulation soundness, as in the experiment of Definition 5. Then, one can invoke a suitable version of the forking lemma to show that it is possible to "extract" a witness w for x from such an adversary, contradicting the fact that x is false. The reduction simulates the list T for A in the simulation soundness experiment, in particular one needs to fake accepting proofs for (adaptively chosen and potentially false) theorems selected by the attacker. In order to do so, Fouque and Pointcheval (implicitly) rely on the SS-HVZK property. The next theorem is a generalization of the above strategy which does not rely on the SS-HVZK property and indeed applies to arbitrary languages. Moreover, we are able to prove a stronger statement, namely that Fiat-Shamir proofs satisfy weak simulation extractability (and not only simulation soundness). For simplicity the following theorem assumes (perfect) unique responses, but could be generalized using the same reduction as for Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Weak simulation extractability of the Fiat-Shamir transform). Let Σ = (P, V) be a non-trivial Σ-protocol with unique responses for a language L ∈ NP. In the random oracle model, the NIZK proof system Σ FS = (P H , V H ) resulting by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to Σ is weakly simulation extractable with extraction error ν = Q h for the canonical simulator S. Here, Q is the number of random oracle queries and h is the number of elements in the range of H. Furthermore, the extractor E A needs to run A S 1 (·),S 2 (·) twice, where A and E A are both defined in Definition 6.
Proof. Let S be the canonical zero-knowledge simulator described in the proof of Theorem 2. Denote with (x , α , γ ) the pair statement/proof returned by A S 1 (·),S 2 (·) ; we describe an extractor E A , able to compute a witness w by rewinding A once.
We want to exploit the general forking lemma1. In order to do so, we define program P (1 k , h 1 , . . . , h Q ; ρ P ) as follows: P virtually splits ρ P into two random tapes ρ and ρ S (e.g. by using even bits for ρ and odd bits for ρ S ) and runs internally A S 1 (·),S 2 (·) with randomness ρ. P uses values (h 1 , . . . , h Q ) to simulate fresh answers of S 1 , and ρ S to simulate answers of S 2 . If A S 1 (·),S 2 (·) outputs (x , (α , γ )), P checks that it is a valid proof and not in T (otherwise it returns (0, ⊥)). Then, because of the unique response property, (x , α ) must correspond to some fresh query to S 1 and P outputs (J, (x , α , γ )), where J > 0 is the index corresponding to the random oracle query (x , α ). We say that P is successful whenever J ≥ 1, and we denote with acc the corresponding probability. Given program P, we consider two related runs of P with the same random tape but different hash values, as specified by the forking algorithm F P of Lemma 1. Denote with (I, (x , α , γ )) ← P(1 k , h 1 , . . . , h Q ; ρ) and (I , (x , α , γ )) ← P (1 k , h 1 , . . . , h I−1 , h I , . . . , h Q ; ρ) the two outputs of A in these runs. By the forking lemma we know that with probability ext ≥ acc(acc/Q − 1/h) the forking algorithm will return indexes I, I such that I = I , I ≥ 1 and h I = h I .
Notice that since F P 's forgeries are relative to the same random oracle query I = I , we must have x = x and α = α ; on the other hand we have h I = h I . We are thus in a position to invoke the special extractor E for the underlying proof system, yielding a valid witness w ← E(α , h I , γ , h I , γ , x ) such that (x , w ) ∈ R L .
Assume now that acc ≥ ν. By applying the general forking lemma1 we obtain that ext ≥ acc 2 /Q − acc/h. Since Q is polynomial while h is exponentially large in the security parameter, for sure Q h < 1 (in particular, it is negligible in k). As ν := Q h , we have:
The previous inequality matches the definition of weak extractability with values p = Q and d = 2.
Applications
In the literature there is a large number of applications for simulation-sound or extractable NIZKs. One of the first request for simulation soundness comes from the setting of public key encryption, for the design of encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security using the NaorYung (NY) paradigm [36] . At a high level, the NY works as follows: given two key pairs (sk , pk ) and (sk , pk ) for CPA-secure encryption schemes Π and Π respectively, a ciphertext consists of two encryptions c, c of the same message m, under different keys pk , pk , and a NIZK proof π that both c and c encrypt m. In order to achieve security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA2), the underlying NIZK must be simulation-sound. While achieving CCA2 security is probably one of the most prominent application of simulation soundness, simulation-sound or extractable proofs have been used, e.g., to build also leakage-resilient signatures or KDM secure encryption. In this section, we review some important applications of such proof systems and show how our result provides more efficient constructions in the ROM or generalizes earlier results that use the Fiat-Shamir transform.
Leakage Resilience
Simulation-sound and simulation-extractable NIZK proofs have been very useful in constructing leakage-resilient encryption and signature schemes [19, 33, 35] . Here, we consider these works and show that our result immediately yields efficient leakage-resilient schemes in the random oracle model.
Leakage-resilient signatures.
A signature scheme is leakage resilient if it is hard to forge a signature even given (bounded) leakage from the signing key. Obviously, this requires that the amount of leakage given to the adversary has to be smaller than the length of the secret key, as otherwise the leakage may just reveal such a key, trivially breaking the security of the signature scheme.
We instantiate the generic construction of leakage-resilient signatures based on leakageresilient hard relations and simulation-extractable NIZKs of [19] using the Fiat-Shamir transform. Let R be a λ-leakage-resilient hard relation with sampling algorithm Gen R (for detailed definitions, see Definition 9 and Definition 10 in Appendix D.1). Let (P H , V H ) be a NIZK argument 5 for relation R defined by R ((pk , m), sk ) ⇔ R(pk , sk ). Consider the following signature scheme:
KeyGen(1 k ) : Calls (pk , sk ) ← Gen R (1 k ) and returns the same output.
Sign(sk , m) : Outputs σ ← P H ((pk , m), sk ). 6
5 As opposed to a proof system where soundness needs to hold unconditionally, in an argument system it is sufficient that soundness holds with respect to a computationally bounded adversary. 6 Note that m is part of the instance being proven.
Vrf(pk , m, σ): Verifies the signature by invoking V H ((pk , m), σ).
Notice that σ ← P H ((pk , m), sk ) is a NIZK proof for the hard relation obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform. We chose to state the theorem below using an argument system as this is the minimal requirement under which leakage resilience of the scheme can be proven. Since our FS-based protocols are weakly simulation-extractable NIZK proof systems, they automatically satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4.
If R is a 2λ-leakage-resilient hard relation and (P H , V H ) is a weakly simulationextractable NIZK argument with negligible extraction error for relation R ((pk , m), sk ) ⇔ R(pk , sk ), then the above scheme is a λ-leakage-resilient signature scheme in the random oracle model.
The proof of the theorem from above follows the one of Theorem 4.3 in [19] . A couple of subtleties arise, though. The main idea of the proof is to build a reduction from an adversary A breaking λ-leakage resilience of the signature scheme to an adversary B breaking the hardness of the 2λ-leakage-resilient hard relation R. Roughly speaking, in the reduction B is given some instance pk and simulates the signing queries of A by using the zero-knowledge simulator of the NIZK, and the leakage queries by using the leakage oracle for the relation R. At some point A outputs a forgery σ and B invokes the extractor of Theorem 3 to get sk ← E A (pk , σ ). The first issue is that we are only guaranteed weak simulation-extractability, whereas the proof of [19] relies on full simulation-extractability. 7 However, this is not a problem because we just need to show that B outputs a valid witness with non-negligible probability. A second issue involves the extractor of Theorem 3, which needs to rewind A once and, thus, to simulate twice its environment (including the leakage queries). This causes the loss of a factor 2 in the total amount of tolerated leakage. We refer the reader to Appendix D.2 for the details.
We emphasize that the leakage-resilient signature scheme of Alwen et al. [4] , obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to the Okamoto identification scheme, follows essentially the above paradigm. Here, one may view the public and secret keys of the Okamoto ID scheme as forming an instance of a leakage-resilient hard relation, while the NIZK proof corresponds to the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the Okamoto identification protocol.
Naor-Yung with leakage. The definition of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of an encryption scheme can be extended to the leakage setting by giving the adversary access to a leakage oracle. Naor and Segev [35] show that the Naor-Yung paradigm instantiated with a simulation-sound NIZK allows to leverage CPA-security to CCA-security even in the presence of leakage. In other words, if Π is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks, the encryption scheme obtained by applying the Naor-Yung paradigm to (Π, Π), using a simulation-sound NIZK, is CCA2-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks. In Appendix D.3 we revisit their proof in the ROM, dealing with the issue that the leakage queries can potentially depend on H. We stress that for the proof only simulation soundness is needed (i.e., our result from Theorem 2) and not weak simulation extractability.
In what follows, we propose a concrete instantiation of the result above, relying on the BHHO encryption scheme from [13] . Let G be a group of prime-order q. For randomly selected generators g 1 , . . . , g $ ← G, the public key is a tuple pk = (g 1 , . . . , g , h), where h = i=1 g z i i for a secret key sk = (z 1 , . . . , z ) ∈ Z q . To encrypt a message m ∈ G, choose a random r $ ← Z q and output c = (c 1 , . . . , c +1 ) = (g r 1 , . . . , g r , m · h r ). The message m can be recovered by computing
7 Actually, they rely on a weaker property called true simulation-extractability [19] .
Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, Naor and Segev [35] showed that the BHHO encryption scheme is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks for any = 2 + λ+ω(log k) log q , where k is the security parameter. Applying the Naor-Yung paradigm, consider the language:
where c = (c 1 , . . . , c +1 ) and c = (c 1 , . . . , c +1 ) are BHHO encryptions with randomness r and r , using public keys pk = (g 1 , . . . , g , h) and pk = (g 1 , . . . , g , h ) respectively. The pair w = (r, r ) is a witness for a string x = (c, pk , c , pk ) ∈ L. Consider the following interactive protocol Σ = (P, V) for the above language:
1. P chooses s, s at random from Z q and computes the commitment:
2. The verifier V chooses a random challenge β
3. The prover computes the response γ = (γ, γ ) = (s − β · r, s + β · r ).
4. Given a proof π = ( α, β, γ), the verifier V checks that:
In Appendix D.4 we prove that the above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the language L. With the Naor-Yung paradigm applied to the BHHO encryption scheme we get a ciphertext (c, c , π) consisting of 4 + 3 elements in G plus 2 elements in Z q . Moreover, the fact that the BHHO encryption scheme is CPA-secure against key leakage together with the result of Naor-, show that the above instantiation is CCA-secure against key-leakage attacks.
Corollary 1. Let k be a security parameter. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, the Naor-Yung paradigm applied to the BHHO encryption scheme yields an encryption scheme that is CCA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks in the random oracle model for λ = log q(1
, where L is the length of the secret key. An encryption consists of 4 + 3 elements in G plus 2 elements in Z q .
Key-Dependent Message Security
Key-dependent message (KDM) security of a public-key encryption scheme requires that the scheme remains secure even against attackers allowed to see encryptions of the value f (sk ), where f ∈ F for some class of functions F.
Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [14] show that a variation of the Naor-Yung paradigm instantiated with a simulation-sound NIZK can still leverage CPA-security to CCA-security, even in the context of KDM security. We revisit their proof in the random oracle model in Appendix D.5. Also in this case, only simulation soundness is needed for the proof.
Roughly, for some function family F, if Π is KDM[F]-CPA secure and Π is CPA-secure, the scheme Π obtained by applying the Naor-Yung paradigm to (Π, Π ) -i.e., an encryption of m ∈ M is a tuple c = (c, c , π) where c encrypts m under Π, c encrypts m under Π and π is a simulation-sound NIZK proof that c and c encrypt the same message -is KDM[F]-CCA secure.
Let sk i [j] denote the j-th bit of sk i . The BHHO encryption scheme was the first KDM-CPA secure encryption scheme, with respect to the class of all projection functions F ↓ = F read ∪ F flip , where
More generally, when the message space is a linear space over Z q , we define the function class PJ (F ↓ ) as the class of all affine combinations of elements in F ↓ . Now we can instantiate the general transform of [14] as follows. We choose Π to be BHHO, Π to be ElGamal (say with pk = h = g z 1 1 ) and we build a Σ-protocol Σ for the NaorYung language relative to Π and Π . Protocol Σ can be easily derived from protocol Σ of the last section, by just compressing the commitment as in α = ((g s  1 , . . . , g s ), g s 1 , h s · (h ) s ) (and simplifying the verification procedure accordingly). Hence, Theorem 2 yields the following result.
Corollary 2. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, the Naor-Yung paradigm instantiated with BHHO and ElGamal encryption schemes yields a KDM[PJ (F ↓ )]-CCA secure encryption scheme in the random oracle model. An encryption consists of + 3 elements in G plus 3 elements in Z q .
Beyond Naor-Yung. Another paradigm that yields chosen-ciphertext security from NIZKs, based on proving knowledge of the plaintext, was suggested by Rackoff and Simon [38] . Such a construction is somewhat more natural and more efficient than the twin-encryption paradigm: a message m is encrypted (only once) under a CPA-secure encryption scheme, and a NIZK proof of knowledge of the plaintext is attached to the ciphertext. However, (to the best of our knowledge) truly efficient constructions for sufficiently strong NIZK proofs of knowledge are not available even using random oracles. One can hope that using the weaker from of extractability afforded by the Fiat-Shamir transform one could at least obtain NM-CPA secure encyption, and this is indeed what is aimed at in the ongoing work of [9] .
A Defining Proofs of Knowledge
Many different definitions of proof of knowledge have been proposed in the literature. According to Unruh [41] , it is possible to identify three main distinct notions, which he refers to as A, B and C-style PoKs.
Definition 8 (PoK). Let ν : {0, 1} * → [0, 1] be a function and R be a binary relation, with corresponding language L R . A protocol (P, V) is a proof of knowledge for R, with knowledge error ν if the following properties hold:
Completeness. For any pair (x, w) ∈ R, if P and V follow the protocol specification on public input x and private input w (held by P), then the verifier accepts.
Validity. There exist a probabilistic oracle machine E and a constant c > 0 such that, for any x ∈ L R , whenever a prover P * convinces V on common input x with probability (|x|) > ν(|x|), then the extractor E P * , taking x as an input and having oracle access to P * , outputs a witness w such that R(x, w) = 1, (A-style) working in strict polynomial time, with probability at least
for c > 0 and a polynomial p.
(B-style) within expected number of steps bounded by
.
(C-style) working in expected polynomial time, with probability at least
B Honest-verifier zero-knowledge and neighborhood
The HVZK property essentially says there exists a simulator S that produces, on input x, transcripts that are indistinguishable from real conversations between P and V sharing input x, as long as V behaves honestly. It is possible to give stronger flavors of this property. A first example is the case of special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK), as introduced by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [17] . Intuitively, this property says that the simulator S can take any β as input and produce a conversation indistinguishable from the space of all conversations between honest parties in which β is the challenge. To formalize this, the experiments of Definition 1 are modified in such a way that both the verifier and the simulator get also β as input. Even though the S-HVZK property is seemingly stronger than the plain HVZK property, the two notions are essentially equivalent. In fact, as Fischlin showed in [23] , any Σ-protocol where the challenge has size logarithmic in the security parameter, satisfies the stronger requirement of S-HVZK.
A stronger variant of zero-knowledge -first introduced by Bellare and Ristov [7] -is strong special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SS-HVZK), which differs from the previous one in the fact that the simulator has to produce indistinguishable triplets (α, β, γ) where the string γ can be chosen at random and S can compute the commitment α trough a deterministic function φ of
−→ Accept iff V 1 (x, α, β, γ) = 1 and z = f (r) Figure 2 : The protocol Σ , separating SS-HVZK and S-HVZK.
x, β and γ, i.e. α := φ(x, β, γ). We exhibit a separation between the SS-HVZK and S-HVZK properties, by showing that any Σ-protocol which is SS-HVZK can be turned into another Σ-protocol which is still S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK. For proving such a claim, we just need to assume the existence of one-way functions. The transform is depicted in Figure 2 . Let f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be a one-way function. We start with an arbitrary Σ-protocol Σ = (P, V) which satisfies the SS-HVZK property. The protocol Σ = (P , V ) is essentially identical to Σ, however the prover now also samples a random r and adds r to the commitment α; moreover it also appends z = f (r) to the last message. The verifier V runs the verifier V, but also checks that z = f (r).
Proposition 2 (Separation between S-HVZK and SS-HVZK).
Assuming the existence of oneway functions, there exists a Σ-protocol which is S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK. More precisely, let Σ = (P, V) be a Σ-protocol which is SS-HVZK and f be a one-way function. Then, the protocol Σ = (P , V ) of Figure 2 is S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK.
Proof. We show that the protocol Σ cannot satisfy the stronger SS-HVZK property, even if the original protocol Σ does. The intuition for this is that, if it could be possible to compute the commitment α after having chosen the challenge β and the response γ , then it could also be possible to invert f . We now turn this intuition into a formal proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that Σ is SS-HVZK. This means that there exists a simulator S which can choose γ at random (for all β), and compute α = (α, r) as a deterministic function α = φ(x, β, γ ) of the other values. We now show how to use S to build a PPT adversary B able to break one-wainess of the function f . The attacker B simply chooses a random image z $ ← {0, 1} * , samples β, γ at random and runs S (x, β, γ = (γ, z), 1 k ) which returns α = φ(x, β, γ ). Since α = (α, r) is such that f (r) = z, the adversary B has found a pre-image of z, namely r = f −1 (z), breaking the one-wayness of f . Note, however, that the protocol Σ is still S-HVZK. In fact, for every β, the (special) HVZK simulator S can just run the SS-HVZK simulator S of the underlying protocol Σ, yielding α ← S(x, β, γ, 1 k ), and later append r $ ← {0, 1} * to α and z = f (r) to γ by itself.
C Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to the proof of [41, Theorem 2] . Consider an adversary A having access to (S 1 , S 2 ) that outputs a pair (x, π) which makes the verifier V of the composed system accept, i.e. V S 1 (x, π) = 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that A consists of n machines A i , each machine running the i-th execution in the composed system. For i ≥ 2, A i expects some state st from A i−1 ; such a state includes a proof π and the internal coin tosses ρ of A i−1 . Let E be the extractor for (P, V). We construct an extractor E for (P , V ) as follows. E chooses an index i ∈ [n] uniformly at random and internally simulates the first i − 1 executions of the composed system (with A 1 , . . . , A i−1 ). Let st = (π, ρ) be the state that A i−1 passes to
Denote with a i the probability that A is successful in the first i executions. (Note that in particular a i−1 is the probability that in an execution of E the internal simulation of the first i − 1 executions succeeds.) Let c i denote the probability that the i-th execution of the composed system succeeds, conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 executions succeed. We have a 0 = 1 and a i = c i · a i−1 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Denote with ext the probability that E extracts a witness and with acc the probability that A is successful in the composed system. Moreover, for some fixed index i, let ext i be the probability that E succeeds given that index i was chosen. Hence, we must have ext =
We proceed to bound ext i . Denote with D i−1 the probability distribution of the state output by A i−1 conditioned on the fact that the first i − 1 executions were successful. Clearly, the probability that E succeeds conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 executions were successful is E[ext i (st)], where ext i (st) denotes the probability that E A i (x, st) outputs a witness.
, where st is distributed accordingly to D i−1 . Using the hypothesis that (P, V) has extraction error ν, we get that there exists a constant d > 0 and a polynomial p such that ext
where acc i (st) denotes the probability that A i is successful using state st. Putting all together, we can conclude:
where the second inequality in the chain is obtained by applying Jensen's inequality E[f (X)] ≥ f (E[X]) (for any random variable X and convex function f ). Let now δ = (acc − ν n ). Assume that δ > 0 otherwise there is nothing to prove.
Claim 1.
There exists an index i ∈ [n] such that
Proof of claim. We need to prove that there exists some i ∈ [n] such that
Assume, towards a contradiction, that for all indexes i ∈ [n] we have
However this is impossible, because by construction a 0 − a n = 1 − acc .
For the index i of the above claim, we have
and hence
Since p · n d+1 = p , the proposition follows.
D Details Omitted from Applications D.1 Definitions of Leakage-Resilient Primitives
Leakage-Resilient Hard Relations and Signatures. For completeness, we recall some definitions from [19] that we mention in section 5.1.
Definition 9 (Leakage-resilient hard relation). A binary relation R ⊂ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * is called λ-leakage-resilient hard relation if: (i) there exists an efficient sampling algorithm Gen R such that for any pair (pk , sk ) ← Gen R (1 k ), it holds R(pk , sk ) = 1, (ii) deciding whether a pair satisfies R(pk , sk ) = 1 or not can be done in polynomial time, (iii) any efficient adversary A has negligible advantage in winning the experiment defined below:
that is, for any PPT A, it holds:
Definition 10 (Leakage-resilient signature). Let Π = (Gen, Sign, Vrf) be a signature scheme.
The following experiment models an unforgeability game where the adversary gets leakage information on the signing key.
Output 1 if and only if:
In the experiment above, T is a list containing queries to Sign and corresponding answers. A signature scheme Π is λ-leakage resilient if any PPT adversary A has only negligible advantage in winning the unforgeability game:
Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definitions of CPA and CCA security against λ-key-leakage attacks from [35] . Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme and denote with PK k , SK k the sets of public/secret keys that are produced by Gen(1 k ). We define an oracle O λ sk depending on a secret key sk ∈ SK k , which takes as input (the description of) functions f i : SK k → {0, 1} λ i . An oracle machine A is a λ-key-leakage adversary if A has access to O λ sk and the total leakage is bounded by i λ i ≤ λ. Consider the following experiments:
We next construct an adversary B that runs A as a subroutine and breaks the security of the leakage-resilient hard relation R. Adversary B behaves as follows: after receiving pk as the challenge for the hard relation, it simulates the environment for A and answers her oracle queries. To this end, B forwards A's leakage queries, addressed to oracle O λ sk , to its own oracle O 2λ sk , and returns the answer to A. To answer signing queries for m i , B creates simulated proofs σ i ← S(pk , m i ). When A outputs a forgery (m , σ ), adversary B runs the extractor E A (pk , σ ) to obtain sk , hence outputs this value as a witness for pk . Notice that by running the extractor E A (pk , σ ), we need to rewind A which requires to simulate its leakage queries again. Hence, the need for a 2λ leakage oracle (cf. Theorem 3) .
It remains to analyze the success probability of B in breaking the security of the leakageresilient hard relation R(pk , sk ). Let Win be the event that A wins in Game 1, that is she outputs a pair (m , σ ) accepted by V H , and let Ext be the event that the extractor E A computes a valid witness sk (cf. Definition 6). We have
In the above, Eq. (1) uses the fact that if A produces a valid forgery (m, σ ) and the extractor E A succeeds and outputs a valid witness sk from such forgery, then B wins: indeed, it simply returns sk . This implies that:
(1
In Eq. (2), we use the definition of conditional probability. In Eq. (3) we use the fact that (P H , V H ) has negligible extraction error and that conditioned on Win the verification always succeeds, i.e., acc = 1 in Theorem 3. Finally, in Eq. (3) we use our assumption that := Prob[Win] is non-negligible, which implies that for any polynomial p and constant d,
is also non-negligible. This yields a contradiction to the security of the leakage-resilient hard relation R and concludes the proof.
D.3 Revisiting Naor-Segev in the ROM
Naor-Yung paradigm. In the random oracle model, the Naor-Yung (NY) construction considers two encryption schemes with CPA-security Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec), Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) and a NIZK proof system (P H , V H ) for the following language:
where the public keys pk and pk are generated by Gen and Gen respectively. The new encryption scheme Π * = (Gen * , Enc * , Dec * ) is as follows:
Key generation: Runs (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ), (pk , sk ) ← Gen (1 k ), and outputs keys pk = (pk , pk ) and sk = (sk , sk ).
Encryption: Computes ciphertexts c = Enc(pk , m; r) and c = Enc (pk , m; r ), invokes the prover P H on public input (c, c , pk , pk ) and private input (m, r, r ) to get a NIZK proof π for (c, c , pk , pk ) ∈ L N Y .
Decryption: Checks the validity of proof π by calling the (public) verification procedure V H ((c, c ), π). If π is accepted, uses decryption algorithm Dec(sk , ·) on ciphertext c.
The extension of the Naor-Yung paradigm of twin encryption to the key-leakage framework has been proven by Naor and Segev [35] for NIZK proofs in the CRS model. They show that, when the NY paradigm is applied to leakage-resilient schemes, the resulting CCA-secure encryption scheme is still leakage-resilient. More precisely, starting from an encryption schemes Π which is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks, one gets a CCA-secure encryption scheme Π * secure against λ-key-leakage attacks. The proof of Naor and Segev is similar to the one appeared in [34] , except for the presence of a leakage oracle O λ sk . The intuition is that a ciphertext (c, c , π) can be decrypted by using only one secret key. Indeed, given knowledge of one of the two secret keys, decryption can be carried out by checking the validity of π (the verification procedure is public) and decrypting the corresponding ciphertext with the known secret key. In the leakage setting, the CPA-attacker has also to answer to leakage queries made by the CCA-attacker. Again, a single secret key is sufficient for this purpose.
Below, we prove the ROM-equivalent of the result above when NIZKs are built in the random oracle model (in particular, when using the Fiat-Shamir transform). The only potential issue is that, since the random oracle is public, leakage functions might also depend on it. However, since we make use of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs, this fact does not affect the proof because the random oracle takes as input only public data (namely, the statement x to be proven and the commitment α in the NIZK proof).
3 → 4 The transition between Game 3 and Game 4 is equivalent to the one involving games 1 and 2, that we have already discussed. Since the scheme Π is CPA-secure, indistinguishability of ciphertexts Enc(pk , m 0 ) and Enc(pk , m 1 ) implies that the probabilities of succeeding in the two games are negligibly close.
4 → 5 Another symmetry makes similar the transition from Game 4 to Game 5 with the one between games 0 and 1: indistinguishability follows from the zero-knowledge property of the non-interactive proof system.
5 → 6 Game 6 differs from Game 5 in that the decryption oracle restarts to decrypt ciphertext c by using secret key sk , as in the original experiment. To notice the difference, an efficient distinguisher should be able to produce an invalid ciphertext (c, c , π), hence an accepted proof π for a false statement, as for the transition between games 2 and 3. We have already seen that no adversary is allowed to do so, otherwise the simulation soundness of the proof system would be broken. Moreover, in games 5 and 6, the challenge ciphertext contains two encryptions of the same message m 1 , that means it is a valid ciphertext. The adversary is not even allowed to get fake simulated proof, thus producing fresh fake proofs would in fact violate the soundness property of the proof system.
D.4 Σ-Protocol for BHHO
Proof. Completeness condition is trivially satisfied. In order to prove that the protocol is special sound, let π 1 = ( α, β 1 , γ 1 ) and π 2 = ( α, β 2 , γ 2 ) be two different accepted proofs for a given theorem x = (c, pk , c , pk ), with challenges β 1 = β 2 . We show how to extract a witness for x ∈ L. The validity of both proofs implies that, for any i = 1, . . . , , we have:
From the first pair of equations we can easily compute g 
The last equations prove that the ciphertexts encrypt the same message, that is to say the statement x is in L.
It's not difficult to see that the protocol is not only HVZK, but also SS-HVZK. Indeed, computing the response γ as the third move of the prover is the same as choosing it at random in Z q × Z q , because both s and β, like so s and β , are chosen at random. Once a response γ is chosen, for any challenge β we can easily compute a commitment α in such a way that the triplet ( α, β, γ) satisfies the check: this is a consequences of the special form the verification procedure has, that directly shows how to compute α. Given this, a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm which acts as an SS-HVZK simulator can be described.
D.5 Revisiting Camenisch-Chandran-Shoup in the ROM
Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme and denote with PK k , SK k the sets of public/secret keys that are produced by Gen(1 k ). Also, for integer n, denote with Gen (n) (1 k ) the algorithm which outputs two vectors ( pk , sk ) containing n public/secret keys. Given the message space M, consider the family of functions:
We define an oracle ∆ b (i, f ) depending on a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and taking as input an index i ∈ [n] and a function f ∈ F. Whenever b = 1, the oracle returns Enc(pk i , f ( sk )) (i.e., an encryption of f ( sk ) under the i-th public key in pk ); otherwise it returns Enc(pk i , 0) (i.e., the encryption of a fixed message in M). Consider the following experiments:
